Some recent articles suggest that increasing wage in the nursing market with the aim of reducing shortage can negatively impact on the average ability and motivation of applicants attracted and, in turn, on the average quality of care.
INTRODUCTION
This paper investigates how the nursing wage level affects the number of registered nurses and nursing assistants that will be potentially available in the future-the long-run supply of nurses-and the quality of care provided by future nurses.
This research question is not trivial because many countries around the world are concerned about nursing shortage. In 2012, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics listed registered nursing and nursing assistance among the top 12 occupations in terms of projected job openings due to growth and replacement needs in the United States, as reported in Table 1 . Table 2 shows that a similar scenario concerning nurses and caregivers occurs in another aging developed country, namely, Italy. The above evidence suggests that the goal of a sustainable recruitment and retention of nurses should be in the political agenda of aging industrialized countries. This is why a recent literature has begun to study how the level of wage affects the long-run supply of nurses. Chiha and Link (2003) find a significant and positive effect of registered nurses' wage on the number of people who enter first-degree nursing programs in the United States. A similar conclusion is drawn by Buhr (2009) , who shows that earnings have a positive effect in attracting persons who are not currently working as nurses in Canada, and Buchan and Black (2011) , who report on some case study countries where a significant pay raise was awarded to nurses.
A second stream of literature (Barigozzi and Turati 2012; Heyes 2005 Heyes , 2007 Taylor 2007 ; henceforth HTBT) theoretically investigates self-selection in nursing and confirms that an increasing wage, together with additional undergraduate places at universities, helps mitigate the shortage problem by attracting more applicants to the nursing career. Nevertheless, Heyes (2005) shows such a recipe might entail an undesirable side-effect. In his setup, potential applicants are endowed with a dichotomous characteristic, that is, motivation: poorly motivated potential applicants provide lower quality of care than motivated individuals. The key assumption is that motivated individuals require a lower minimum wage to choose nursing instead of the best alternative job (i.e., a lower reservation wage) because they enjoy a nonpecuniary "motivational" premium only when they work as nurses. Following a pay raise, poorly motivated potential applicants are more likely to choose nursing, thus reducing the average motivation of applicants and the average quality of care. The existence of this mechanism, referred to as inefficiency wage by Heyes, is confirmed by Taylor (2007) who, yet, finds conditions under which pay affects positively the utilitarian welfare. Barigozzi and Turati (2012) extend Heyes (2005) by allowing for a second dichotomous characteristic of potential applicants, that is, ability. They derive conditions under which pay has an adverse effect on both the average ability and the average motivation of applicants.
The above predictions are at odds with the scant evidence about how pay affects the selection of health professionals. Nickell and Quintini (2002) report that the relative pay of many public sector workers in the United Kingdom declined sharply after the mid-1970s. Using general and mathematics tests' score percentile positions as an indicator of workers' ability, they find that men entering public sector occupations such as, among others, doctors and nurses in the early 1990s had a lower test score position than those entering in the late 1970s. After observing that regulated pay for nurses is almost flat across the UK, Propper and Van Reenen (2010) show that lower outside wages, that is, higher relative pay of nursing, attract better nurses and enhance hospital quality as measured by hospital deaths for emergency heart attacks. Dal Bó, Finan, and Rossi (2013) , even if focused on a recruitment process for public sector positions rather than on health professionals, is worth citing. The authors find that higher wages attract more able applicants, as measured by their intelligence quotient, and more motivated applicants, as measured by their proclivity toward public sector work; remarkably, the second aspect is evidence of advantageous rather than adverse selection effects on motivation. 1 The inefficiency wage mechanism in the nursing sector has been criticized on the basis that nurses' motivation is modeled in an overly simplistic way, its only effect being a reduction of the reservation wage. In particular, the nontechnical articles by Nelson and Folbre (2006) and Adams and Nelson (2009) remark that HTBT overlook the so-called motivational crowding-in effect (Frey, 1997) , that is, the positive impact of a pay raise on nurses' motivation when the pay raise is perceived as acknowledging nurses' efforts. This is a legitimate criticism, yet focused on the quantity and quality of 1 Evidence is instead mixed if a broader focus on public sector jobs where both ability and motivation of workers may matter for quality is considered. Ferraz and Finan (2009) study salaries of local legislators across Brazil's municipal governments and find that higher wages improve the quality of politicians, as measured by education, type of previous profession, and political experience in office. Gagliarducci and Nannicini (2013) use data on Italian municipal governments from 1993 to 2001 and conclude that higher wage attracts more educated candidates. The opposite result is found by Merlo, Galasso, Landi, and Mattozzi (2010) in the case of Italian parliamentarians. Relying on the 2009 base pay harmonization for the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), Fisman, Harmon, Kamenica, and Munk (2015) find that the huge pay raise (200% per national delegation on average) lowered the ability of elected MEPs, measured by the selectivity of their undergraduate institutions. Finally, Banuri and Keefer (2016) run a laboratory experiment and show that less pro-socially motivated subjects are more likely to choose a public sector job when wages are high.
care supplied by currently existing nurses-the short-run supply of nurses-whereas the result in HTBT relates to the recruitment of future nurses.
Interestingly, the present analysis shows that the inefficiency wage result can be reversed even when the focus is on the long-run supply. To this aim, an adverse selection framework à la HTBT, rather than a moral hazard one à la Frey, is developed where (a) the quality of care depends on nurses' ability and motivation; (b) for any given level of motivation, able potential applicants require a higher reservation wage than nonable ones; (c) the effect of pay on motivation holds at the level of the aggregate nursing supply, and not at the level of the individual potential nurse, whose degree of (ability and) motivation is given; in other words, the crowding-in effect is disregarded.
Drawing upon self-determination and person-environment fit theories, this paper extends HTBT by providing a precise distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation and gives support to the idea that the motivation of potential nurses is mainly a state of autonomous extrinsic motivation, rather than intrinsic motivation. As will become clear in Section 2, motivated potential nurses value the nursing job not (only) because they like it intrinsically but especially because they can help people in need. In this case, they could seek an alternative job which enables them to help people in need. Possible examples are social worker (e.g., personnel manager in a work integration social enterprise), school counselor, substance abuse counselor, adult literacy teacher, and so forth. Motivated potential nurses therefore enjoy a motivational premium not only when they choose nursing but also when they opt for the best alternative job. On this ground, the assumption that, for any given level of ability, motivated potential applicants ask for a lower reservation wage than poorly motivated ones is likely to be incorrect. As a corollary, setting a relatively high pay can be effective in mitigating the problem of nursing shortage because not only more but also better-more able and more motivated-applicants are attracted: well-paid nurses turn out to be good nurses.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces self-determination and person-environment fit theories, applies them to nursing with the aim of investigating the orientation and the determinants of nurses' motivation, and spells out the contribution of the paper to the literature. The theoretical model along with the main findings are laid out in Section 3. Section 4 concludes. Formal proofs of the results are in the Appendix.
NURSES' MOTIVATION
Self-determination and person-environment fit theories. Self-determination theory (SDT) is an influential psychology theory of human motivation (Deci & Ryan, 1985) . SDT investigates the degree to which an individual's choice to perform an activity is autonomous. More autonomous motivation reflects more self-determination and implies better quality of engagement. Ryan and Deci (2000) distinguish between intrinsic motivation-the most autonomous form of motivation, according to which an activity is done because it is inherently enjoyable-and extrinsic motivation-doing something for some separable consequence. In turn, four forms of extrinsic motivation exist depending on their degree of autonomy.
(a) The least autonomous form is called external regulation, that is, doing something to obtain an externally imposed reward (e.g., nurses do their job to get the salary). (b) Introjected regulation is more autonomous and refers to activities done to avoid guilt or to attain ego-enhancements (e.g., nurses refrain from shirking to avoid peer pressure in the workplace). (c) In case of identified or integrated regulation, an activity is consciously valued by an individual because it helps reaching a "good" goal, good for the society and also for the individual (e.g., nurses go beyond the call of duty to help people in need). There is just a quantitative difference between identified and integrated regulation, the latter being more autonomous in that the good goal is still a separable consequence but more assimilated to the self.
In light of this categorization, the dichotomous classification of potential nurses into poorly motivated and motivated can be described as follows. The former do the bare minimum and can be thought of as being moved only by external regulation. Motivated potential nurses, instead, go beyond the call of duty because they are stimulated by more autonomous forms of motivation. As will be made clear, their motivation is likely to be a state of extrinsic motivation in the form of identified/integrated regulation, rather than pure intrinsic motivation.
To pinpoint the factors that influence the orientation of motivated workers-intrinsic versus autonomous extrinsic motivation-it is useful to consider SDT and person-environment fit theories together; as argued by Greguras, Diefendorff, Carpenter, and Tröster (2014) , they have several common key components. Ryan and Deci (2000: 56) state: "Intrinsic motivation exists in the relation between individuals and activities. People are intrinsically motivated for some activities and not others, and not everyone is intrinsically motivated for any particular task." Intrinsic work motivation is thus affected by both workers' and job characteristics (DeVaro & Brookshire, 2007) . This gives scope to the notion of person-job fit, henceforth P-J fit, which is defined as the match between the needs/desires of a person and what is provided by a job (Edwards, 1991) . The best possible person-job match is the main determinant of intrinsic motivation.
By contrast, in case of identified/integrated regulation, a job is valued by a worker not because it is inherently interesting rather because it helps satisfying a social value like, for example, helping people in need; this represents a separable consequence, which has been internalized by the worker. In this case, the worker is not stimulated by the enjoyment in doing the work itself but by the organizational mission. Consequently, identified/integrated work motivation is affected by person-organization fit, henceforth P-O fit, defined as the compatibility between workers and organizations in terms of value congruence (Tom, 1971) . 2 The difference between P-J fit and P-O fit can be summed up as follows. P-J fit is related to an individual's compatibility with a specific job: the individual loves that job. P-O fit is not necessarily related to a specific job, but, rather, to organizations that match the individual's main social values.
Nurses' motivation. Ryan and Deci (2000) observe that most of the activities people do after childhood are not intrinsically motivating. This may be particularly true in the case of nursing. For instance, in everyday practice, nurses have to perform several tasks that involve physical proximity and touch (Adams and Nelson, (2009): 12) : "[ … ] assisting patients with activities such as eating or toileting, and/or other activities saturated with touch and smell." It is hard to believe that many people would accomplish these tasks out of enjoyment. Motivated nurses are more likely stimulated by some separable, though internalized, consequence (Toode, 2015) . This is confirmed by, for example, Folbre and Nelson (2000: 132) , who refer to care workers' motivation as regard for the well-being of care recipients.
Empirical support for this view comes, to a certain extent, from the few existing analyses that measure not only intrinsic but also extrinsic motivation of nurses. Toode, Routasalo, Helminen, and Suominen (2015) investigate motivation of registered nurses in Estonia through electronically self-reported questionnaire. They find that the three main reasons that motivate registered nurses are, "I enjoy this work very much," "I have fun doing my job," and "this job fits my personal values," in descending order; the first two reasons are related to intrinsic motivation, the third one, instead, to identified/integrated regulation. Similar results are found by Battistelli, Galletta, Portoghese, and Vandenberghe (2013) , who investigate a sample of Italian nurses. Interestingly, the youngest generation of nurses in the Estonian sample has the highest scores of compatibility with the organizational values, which is the main determinant of identified/integrated regulation. Overall, both intrinsic motivation and identified/integrated regulation are relevant in this sample, the latter being more relevant for young nurses and probably for future nurses, that are mostly young and whose self-selection choices are the focus of this paper. Using data from Chinese nurses and physicians, van Beek, Qiao, Schaufeli, Taris, and Schreurs (2012) report that the sample is characterized by moderate intrinsic motivation, while displaying higher scores in identified regulation.
These contributions, mainly focused on registered nurses, support the idea that identified/integrated regulation is a considerable part of nurses' motivation. This is likely to be particularly true for young future nurses, as mentioned, and for nursing assistants, whose tasks require lower skills and can therefore be considered hardly enjoyable.
Contribution to the literature. Bruno Frey was the first scholar to bring SDT into economics. In this process, the terms intrinsic and extrinsic motivation underwent a substantial alteration. Frey (1997: 14) distinguishes activities which individuals do "because they are induced to do so by monetary payment or by command," which he refers to as extrinsically motivated, from activities whose motivations are more autonomous, referred to as intrinsically motivated. In other words, Frey equates extrinsic motivation with external regulation and categorizes intrinsic motivation as the residual set, containing intrinsic motivation in the SDT sense plus introjected, identified, and integrated regulation. HTBT rely on Frey's approach; in particular, Heyes (2005) uses the term "vocation" to define nurses' motivation and takes vocation to be a state of both intrinsic motivation and identified/integrated regulation. 3 Frey's alternative categorization perfectly fits his purpose to investigate the behavioral effect of external regulation on workers' autonomous motivation, the aforementioned crowding-in (and crowding-out) effects. Nevertheless, Frey (1997: 14) acknowledges that his approach is looser than that of SDT: "It may well be that the precise distinction (between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation) is important for psychology."
This paper adds that a rigorous distinction is also important for the study of self-selection into nursing. The reason is as follows. When motivation of potential nurses is taken to be mainly intrinsic in the SDT sense, an inefficiency wage mechanism à la HTBT arises. By contrast, the present analysis finds the opposite result because motivation of potential nurses is mainly considered a state of identified/integrated regulation.
To see this point, suppose for a moment that motivated potential nurses are stimulated by intrinsic motivation in the SDT sense. As discussed above, this occurs when they perceive the best possible match between their psychological needs and the nursing job. By definition, such match is necessarily worse when they dedicate to any different job. The idea that an individual can be intrinsically motivated for only one sort of work is supported by the literature (see, e.g., the discussion on caring relationships and the market in Bruni and Sugden 2008 and Nelson 2009 ). This amounts to assume that the nonpecuniary premium enjoyed by motivated potential applicants when they enter nursing is larger than that enjoyed, if any, when they choose an alternative job; the inefficiency wage result follows.
By contrast, and unlike previous contributions, the present paper draws a clear line between intrinsic motivation and identified/integrated regulation and between the different determinants of these two types of motivations. Doing so, it provides support for the idea that motivated potential nurses are characterized by identified/integrated regulation, whose source is P-O fit. In this case, as argued in Section 1, motivated potential nurses can turn their attention to alternative jobs in organizations which enable them to help people in need. The idea that potential caregivers may be motivated for a number of types of work is supported by, for example, Nelson (2009) . As a result, the motivational premium enjoyed when the outside job option is chosen is likely to be higher than or equal to the nursing motivational premium, with the effect that, for any given level of ability, motivated potential applicants require a non-lower reservation wage than poorly motivated ones; the best, both able and motivated, potential nurses are attracted only when a relatively high pay is offered. This efficiency wage result is the novel contribution of the present paper.
THE SETUP
Consider a nursing market where potential applicants are endowed with two dichotomous characteristics: ability, whose level is measured by parameter i ∈ { L , H }, H > L > 0, and motivation, whose level is represented by parameter j ∈ { l , h }, h > l > 0. Four types of individuals thus exist: type Hh, endowed with parameters H and h and referred to as able and motivated; type Hl, able and poorly motivated; type Lh, nonable and motivated; type Ll, nonable and poorly motivated. The proportion of type ij individuals in the market is ij > 0, with ij = {L, H} × {l, h} and ∑ ij ij = 1. The following two-period model is investigated.
• Before the first period, nature determines the types of individuals. Each individual privately observes her/his own type.
• In the first period, all individuals decide whether to work as a nurse or to choose their best alternative job outside nursing, after observing the nursing wage, w ≥ 0, and the outside job wage, w O ≥ 0. • In the second period, each nurse selects an effort level e to provide the care service. Similarly, each individual opting for the outside option exerts an effort level a to accomplish the job.
The second-period optimal effort levels
This subsection calculates the effort levels e and a chosen by individuals in the second period. Suppose that a type ij individual decided to work as a nurse in the first period. In this case, her/his utility function is as follows:
The nursing wage w is independent of the individuals' type because the type is private information. Function f (e), f ′ > 0 > f ′′ , denotes the observable but noncontractible quality of care as a function of the effort level. The motivation parameter j measures how much nurses are concerned with the quality of care; since h > l motivated nurses are more concerned than poorly motivated ones. Finally, c (e, i ) is the effort disutility function, c e > 0 and c ee > 0 denoting first and second derivatives with respect to e; higher ability is hypothesized to reduce both the effort disutility and the marginal effort disutility, in symbols, c (e, H ) < c (e, L ) and c e (e, H ) < c e (e, L ), for any given e. 4 Each nurse selects e to maximize the utility function (1). Solving the first order condition (FOC) j f ′ (e)−c e (e, i ) = 0 by e yields the optimal effort levels e * ij , which are assumed to be positive and finite. Applying the implicit function theorem to FOC yields e > 0 and e > 0. Accordingly, for any given ability level, more motivated nurses exert higher optimal effort than less motivated colleagues, e * ih > e * il (> 0), because they care more about quality of care. Similarly, for any given motivation level, able nurses exert higher optimal effort than nonable nurses, e * Hj > e * Lj (> 0), because they incur less effort disutility.
Overall, the lowest (highest) quality of care is provided by nonable and poorly motivated (able and motivated) nurses, whereas the intermediate levels are offered by able and poorly motivated and nonable and motivated nurses. In symbols,
) > 0 denotes the monetary equivalent of a type ij nurse optimal utility net of wage w. For any given level of ability, U ij is increasing in motivation, that is, U ih − U il > 0. 5 This difference is referred to as the nursing motivational premium, due to greater concern for quality. Similarly, one can show that, for any given level of motivation, U ij is increasing in ability, that is, U Hj − U Lj > 0. This difference is referred to as the nursing ability premium, due to lower effort disutility. Alternatively, suppose a type ij individual opted for the outside job in the first period, in which case her/his utility function takes the following form:
The outside job wage w O is independent of the individuals' type; g (a), g ′ > 0 > g ′′ , denotes the observable but noncontractible quality of the outside job output as a function of the effort; the motivation parameter j measures how much individuals care about the quality of output; finally, s (a, i ) is the effort disutility function, with s a > 0, s aa > 0, and, for any given a, s (a, H ) < s (a, L ) and s a (e, H ) < s a (e, L ). Individuals who opted for the outside option selects a to maximize (3). Solving the FOC j g ′ (a) − s a (a, i ) = 0 by a yields the optimal effort levels a * ij , which are assumed to be positive and finite. As above, one can check that both ability and motivation impact positively on a * ij . In symbols, the outside job output quality ranking is
) .
Denoting with
) the monetary equivalent of a type ij worker optimal utility net of wage w O , one can verify that V ih − V il > 0 and V Hj − V Lj > 0, which are referred to as the outside motivational premium and the outside ability premium.
The reservation wage
In this subsection, the first-period choice between the nursing career and the outside job option is analyzed. Such a choice is driven by the nursing reservation wage, defined as the nursing wage level for which individuals are indifferent as to whether to accept the nursing job or the outside option. To calculate the type ij individuals' reservation wages, denoted by w ij , equality (1) = (3) must be solved by w at the optimum: w ij = w O + V ij − U ij . By definition of reservation wage, a type ij individual chooses nursing if w ≥ w ij or the alternative job if w < w ij . The reservation wages are increasing in the outside job optimal utility, w O + V ij , which represents the opportunity cost of becoming a nurse, and decreasing in the nursing optimal utility net of wage w, U ij , that mitigates the opportunity cost of becoming a nurse. 4 The positive impact of motivation on the concern for quality and of ability on the effort disutility is borrowed from the related literature: for example, Equation 3 in Delfgaauw and Dur (2008) .
holds true by definition of (unique) optimal effort and inequality h f (
To rank the reservation wages of the four types of potential applicants, the impact of both ability and motivation is specified as follows. First, the reservation wages are supposed to be an increasing function of individuals' ability, for any given level of motivation. This is a standard assumption in the literature on selection in labor markets (e.g., Caselli and Morelli 2004) and, more specifically, in the case of nursing market (Barigozzi & Turati, 2012) . The usual justification is that more able individuals generally incur larger opportunity costs. In symbols,
which in the current framework is equivalent to V Hj − V Lj > U Hj − U Lj . This inequality states that the outside ability premium, V Hj − V Lj , is larger than the nursing ability premium, U Hj − U Lj . Second, the impact of motivation on the reservation wages is assumed to be nonnegative. This hypothesis is based on the analysis of nurses' motivation in Section 2, according to which the outside motivational premium is likely to be higher than or equal to the nursing motivational premium as long as the alternative job in a different organization enables motivated individuals to help people in need. In symbols, V ih − V il ≥ U ih − U il . As a result, for any given level of ability, more motivated potential nurses have a nonlower reservation wage than less motivated potential colleagues,
On the grounds of (4) and (5), nonable and poorly motivated individuals ask for the lowest reservation wage, whereas able and motivated individuals demand the highest reservation wage. The overall ranking of the reservation wages is as follows:
w Ll ≤ w Lh < w Hl ≤ w Hh when w Lh < w Hl , (a)
Rankings (6) are affected if inequalities (4) and (5) are reversed. Nevertheless, assuming that w Hj ≤ w Lj and w ih < w il seems less plausible. As mentioned, (4) is standard and its opposite would imply that a higher wage is needed to attract less able individuals, for any given level of motivation; this counterintuitive outcome is at odds, for example, with the evidence on health professionals cited in Section 1. As for (5), one can show that the results of this paper are not qualitatively affected when V ih −V il = U ih −U il ⇐⇒ w ih = w il . On top of that, the reverse of (5), which is equivalent to V ih −V il < U ih −U il , would perfectly fit the case of intrinsically motivated potential nurses, as extensively argued in Section 2. Instead, there are several alternative jobs that enable motivated individuals to help people in need in case of extrinsically motivated individuals. Because the outside option is the most preferred among the alternative jobs, it seems reasonable to hypothesize that the outside motivational premium is (at least) equal to the nursing premium.
The quality of nursing care
The last step of the analysis consists of studying how the level of w, set in the first period, affects the average quality of care provided by applicants attracted through their self-selection choices. 6 To streamline the exposition, the reservation wages are arranged in ascending order and the equality conditions in (6-a) are disregarded, so that (6) can be rewritten as
In other words, w n , n = 1, 2, 3, 4, denotes the reservation wage asked for by the n-th "cheapest" potential applicants, which are referred to as type n potential applicants. In addition, the optimal levels of care quality are rewritten as
so that f n denotes the quality of care provided by the n-th cheapest nurses. Finally, the trivial case where no individual chooses nursing as a career is disregarded, that is, the focus is on interval w ≥ max { 0, w 1 } ; at the same time, w 2 is supposed to be strictly positive to have a comprehensive analysis. 
Before proceeding, it is useful to recall that two alternative orderings of both the quality of care and the reservation wages may arise according to (2) and (6); four combinations must therefore be taken into account. More precisely, when the orderings are given either by (2-a) and (6-a) or by (2-b) and (6-b), less and less cheap potential applicants (i.e., those requiring an increasing minimum wage to enter nursing) ensure better and better quality of care. In symbols,
By contrast, when the orderings are given either by (2-a) and (6-b) or by (2-b) and (6-a), the second cheapest potential applicants, type 2, offer higher quality of care than the third cheapest ones, type 3,
The two alternative rankings of care quality, (8) and (9), are summed up in Table 3 and referred to as Scenarios (i) and (ii). Given these premises, potential applicants' self-selection choices as a function of the nursing wage level w are characterized as follows.
(1) If max { 0, w 1 } ≤ w < w 2 , only type 1-the cheapest-individuals enter the nursing market. As a result, the level of quality of care is E 1 (f ) = f 1 . (2) If w 2 ≤ w < w 3 type 1 and type 2 individuals choose nursing. The average level of quality of care is E 2 (f ) = is the proportion of type 1 (type 2) applicants attracted. are the proportions of type 1, type 2, and type 3 applicants attracted. (4) Finally, if w ≥ w 4 also type 4-the most expensive-individuals are attracted to nursing. The average level of quality of care is E 4 (f ) = 1 f 1 + 2 f 2 + 3 f 3 + 4 f 4 , where 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 are the proportions of type 1, type 2, type 3, and type 4 applicants attracted.
First, note that more applicants are attracted as w rises, that is, the long-run supply of nurses increases with the wage. As for the quality of care, an interesting result arises. The scenarios of Table 3 have two common features. (i) f 1 is the minimum level of care quality. This means that the cheapest potential applicants are the "worst" ones. As a result, the quality of care is at its minimum when the nursing wage w is minimum, that is, such that only the cheapest individuals are attracted,
(ii) f 4 is the maximum level of care quality. This means that the most expensive potential applicants are the "best" ones. As shown in Appendix A.1, this implies that E 4 (f ) is the maximum average level of care quality. One can conclude that the average quality of care is at its maximum when the nursing wage w is maximum, that is, such that all potential applicants choose nursing; in symbols, when w ≥ w 4 . This is the novel contribution of the present paper and differentiates it from HTBT. The above findings are summarized in Proposition 1. The long-run supply of nurses is increasing in the wage. Under assumptions (4) and (5) To provide a comprehensive analysis of the effect of w on the average quality of care, two figures are introduced, where the nursing wage w is measured on the horizontal axis and the average quality of care E n (f ) on the vertical axis. For ease of exposition, but without loss of generality, w 1 is set equal to zero.
In both figures, E 1 (f ) is the minimum average level of care quality, whereas E 4 (f ) is the maximum one, as stated in Proposition 1. Figure 1 describes Scenario (i) of Table 3 and shows that the impact of wage on the average quality of care is monotonically positive; Figure 2 considers Scenario (ii) and shows that the average quality of care can increase monotonically with w (solid stepwise line) or fluctuate in w (dotted stepwise line). The conditions under which these two alternative outcomes occur and, more generally, the computations behind Figures 1 and 2 (Bolzano, October 2015) , AIEL Conference (Cagliari, September 2015), Internal Research Seminar Series, Free University of Bozen/Bolzano (Bolzano, December 2014) for useful comments. I gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Free University Bozen/Bolzano (Research project WW2074). The usual caveat applies.
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A.1 Proposition 1
To prove that E 4 (f ) is the maximum average level of care quality, one has to check that (i) E 1 (f ) < E 4 (f ); (ii) E 2 (f ) < E 4 (f ); (iii) E 3 (f ) < E 4 (f ).
(i) E 1 (f ) < E 4 (f ) is obviously fulfilled because E 1 (f ) = f 1 < min {f 2 , f 3 , f 4 }, whereas E 4 (f ) is a strictly convex combination of f 1 , f 2 , f 3 , and f 4 . (ii) E 2 (f ) < E 4 (f ) can be rearranged as
The above inequality is fulfilled by virtue of (8) and (9). Indeed, f 4 is larger than both f 1 and f 2 ; hence, it is also larger than the LHS of (A1), which is given by a strictly convex combination of f 1 and f 2 -the first two terms-plus a negative term. (iii) E 3 (f ) < E 4 (f ) is equivalent to E 3 (f ) < f 4 . Indeed, 
Note that E 3 (f ) < f 4 is fulfilled because E 3 (f ) is a strictly convex combination of f 1 , f 2 , and f 3 ; these three values are all lower than f 4 by virtue of (8) and (9).
A.2 Figures 1 and 2
It is first shown that the average quality of care provided by applicants attracted is monotonically increasing in the nursing wage w, that is, E n (f ) < E n+1 (f ) for any n = 1, 2, 3, if and only if
The equivalence E 3 (f ) < E 4 (f ) ⇐⇒ E 3 (f ) < f 4 , which we prove in Appendix A.1, can indeed be generalized to show that E n (f ) < E n+1 (f ) is equivalent to E n (f ) < f n+1 for any given n = 1, 2, 3. First, one can check that E 1 (f ) = f 1 < E 2 (f ) is equivalent to E 1 (f ) < f 2 :
